The pilot, Chief Warrant Officer Alan Mack, made the call to take the stricken helicopter off as he brought the Chinook back into the air, PO1 Neil C. The Chinook set down at a slight depression, shielding the pilots from the DShK's fire. The Chinook was hit by a further 2 RPGs and more heavy automatic weapons fire from at least three distinct firing points (particularly from a supposedly abandoned DShK position). As machinegun rounds penetrated the unarmored Chinook, another RPG, seconds after the first, hit the Chinook's right-side radar pod, which blew out all electrical power to the helicopter, particularly its miniguns and navigational systems. At around 0245 hours, as Razor 03 flared to land at the LZ and was immediately fired upon by machinegun and RPGs, an RPG struck just behind the cockpit, starting a fire in the cabin. This delay meant that the SEALs could not be inserted into the landing zone east of the peak until 2:30 AM on March 4, with not enough time to reach the peak before daylight.Īn AC-130H Spectre, Nail 22, flew a reconnaissance mission over the peak prior to the landing and saw no enemy activity, but it was called away to support other troops before Razor 03 and 04 arrived at the landing zone MAKO 30 team leader was uneasy at the speed with which the sweep was conducted and wondered whether they had the right mountain but he dismissed his doubts and trusted the Spectre's technology. However, Razor 03 experienced engine difficulties, and two new MH-47s were dispatched to replace the original helicopters. The two teams were picked up by two MH-47 Chinook helicopters of the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, Razor 03 and Razor 04, at 11:23 PM on March 3. With the threat of daylight getting near, the SEALs chose the peak itself as the insertion point. Further complications arose during the second lift off as they were delayed due to an air assault in proximity of the LZ. The AFO suggested insertion at a point 1,400 meters (4,300 ft) east of the peak, but due to a delayed B-52 bomber sortie in the area, the team was told to turn back and land at the airstrip near Gardez. Due to time constraints, a helicopter insertion would be needed for the team to reach the peak before dawn. MAKO 21 planned to link up with AFO team Juliet at the northern end of the valley, resupply it and then establish a hide site/observation post on the eastern ridge above Task Force Rakkasan's blocking position whilst MAKO 30 planned to establish an observation point on the peak of Takur Ghar, which commanded a view of the Shahi-Kot valley. Slabinski (MAKO 30), were to arrive in Gardez for immediate insertion into the Shahi-Kot Valley. In the late evening of March 3, two SEAL teams from DEVGRU, MAKO 30 & MAKO 21, led by Lieutenant Commander Vic Hyder (MAKO 21) and Senior Chief Special Warfare Operator Britt K. The SEALs were not heavily involved in the Operation up to this point but the TF11 commander bluntly ordered their deployment as well as changing the immediate command in an ongoing operation, possibly so that the SEALs could gain combat experience. PoolSize=320 - This can be the size of your choosingĭo note that the ones below in all CAPS are actually DIFFERENT variables than the ones not in caps.In the evening of 3 March 2002, the Task Force 11 leadership essentially ordered the Delta Force AFO commander to pass control of the AFO teams involved in the Operation Anaconda to the SEALs of Task Force Blue-who were moving teams in from Bagram to Gardez for this purpose. NumStreamedMips=0 - Add this to the end of every "TEXTUREGROUP" this includes the comma! ShadowFilterRadius=1.000000 - Higher values will cause some visual glitches, however this will not. CSMSizeScale=4.000000 - WARNING, this massively increases VRAM usage 3.000000 provides a good balance of quality and performance.Find all of the posted values and change them to match unless noted by the comment.Go to the configuration file(s) location.Improving Shadow Quality, Texture Streaming and Level of Detail